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Finland's Economic Freeze
Shivang Mehta
Pomona College
Abstract
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has been well documented and so has Germany’s 
booming manufacturing economy but these events are relatively easy to explain. A paradox-
ical case has been that of Finland; the European Union’s only Nordic member has suffered 
a stark decline of 0.6% in the 3rd quarter GDP growth of 2015, a figure worse than that of 
Greece (Chan, 2015). This paper seeks to analyse the fall of Finland from the perspective 
of Nokia and the changes in the labour market. The paper also explores the decline of the 
Russian economy as a quantitative reason for a lack of capital in the country and analyses 
Finland’s participation in the single currency market as one of the obstacles to its path to 
recovery. The only way to thaw Finland’s frozen economy involves a series of austerity 
measures at the very least, test the strength of the Eurozone’s economy.
Keywords
Finland, Nokia, labour reform, Russia, growth
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Introduction 
As the only Nordic member of the Eurozone, Finland is used to its fair share of dark, 
cold winters and this experience could prove to be useful as the Finnish economy shows no 
signs of thawing. The downfall of Finland has largely escaped public attention due to the 
Greek meltdown, possible because of the glaring structural problems that plague the Greek 
state which easily catch the eye. The Finnish economy, in turn, presents a rather paradoxical 
case; Finland has long been the principle proponent of financial austerity, even during the 
sovereign debt crisis, and has a number of factors which can easily be identified as drivers 
for growth. 
Positive Aspects:
Finland’s education system has consistently been ranked as the best in the world. 
Transformed 40 years ago under Finland’s economic recovery program, the education sys-
tem adopts an approach of personal attention at an unprecedented level and has yielded the 
best Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores in English, Mathematics 
and Sciences consistently for over a decade (OECD, 2016). The cornerstone of the educa-
tion reform has been equality, with the system being designed in a manner to proliferate 
the same quality and level of education, regardless of the school in any urban or rural area. 
This has yielded a 93% rate of education from secondary schools, 17.5% higher than that 
of the United States of America's (USA’s) and a staggering 66% rate of enrolment in higher 
education institutes (OECD, 2016). 
Figure 1: Education Expenditure on Tertiary v/s Primary to not tertiary, 2012
 
 Source: OECD
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The Finnish manage to do so while spending 30% less on their education system than 
the Americans and only spending just above the average amount in the EU. The education 
system thus, definitely acts as a driver for growth which can significantly impact productivity 
in the long run. 
The rise in technological development is the primary reason for the little, if any, op-
timism around the future of the Finnish economy. Markku Kotilaninen of the ETLA, an 
economic think-tank, claims that the start-up ideology has quickly proliferated among the 
youth (OECD, 2016). The government has treated the encouragement of such ventures 
as their priority. The Finnish government have already invested $1.8 Billion to promote 
growth and foster the use of new technology in the country. The government has quickly 
reoriented its innovation policy to focus on environmental and energy business through an 
innovation system which is composed of incentive structures and parties that plan and pro-
pose them such as Tekes (“Innovation Policy,” 2016). This has further been bolstered by 
the Innovation Policy Platform, a joint initiative between the OECD and the World Bank, 
as well as “The Team Finland Network” which seeks to harness the ability to innovate the 
ability in the country and abroad. This has resulted in the World Economic Forum ranking 
Finland second globally for innovation in its competitiveness report and research statistics 
such as number of publications in scientific journals, foreign income from licenses and 
patents, investment in research and development activities by companies being twice the 
average of the rest of the EU (OECD, 2016). The investment in research and development 
(R&D) has largely been diversified under the science, technology and innovation (STI) 
policy with an emphasis on green technology and globalisation while Finland continues to 
lead the way in Human Resource development. The gross domestic spending on R&D has 
slowly risen to 3.2% of the GDP. Tekes, the Finnish agency for technology and innovation, 
has been shifting emphasis away from industrial and technological R&D to service firms and 
small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The policy shift towards SMEs should improve 
the ease of entrepreneurship index (“Innovation Policy,” 2016). 
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 Figure 2: Science and Innovation in Finland, 2011
 
 Source: OECD
Not-So-Positive Aspects:
Finland has historically enjoyed a high level of income and wellbeing. The scenario 
changed following the 2008 recession and the economy has simply failed to recover ever 
since. The GDP fell by 0.6% in Q3 2015, the lowest growth rate after Greece and the pre-
dictions show the continuation of this trend (OECD, 2016). A large reason for this decline 
has been the fall in export growth despite the weaker euro, mainly fuelled by the weaken-
ing of the global demand for capital as well as the declining exports to Russia, Finland’s 3rd 
largest trading partner (“Finnish exports,” 2016). The general rate of unemployment has 
showcased an upward trend as well, currently at 8.3% and predicted to almost touch 10% 
in the coming year. The low rate of income growth has led to household debt rising to a 
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staggering 127% of disposable income and government debt showing an upward trend and 
reaching 71% of the GDP. Disposable income in itself experienced a decline of 0.9% an-
nually in the past year with labour compensation per hour rising at a rate of 1.2% annually 
(OECD, 2016). Another reason has been the decline in the electronic mammoth Nokia. 
Originally making up 4% of Finland’s GDP alone, Nokia has experienced a steady decline 
which has in turn dragged the overall output of the Finnish economy down and aggravated 
the recessionary phase (“The Nokia Effect,” 2012). The paper industries have also suffered 
from a downturn in decline in addition to an overall fall in productivity in manufacturing 
and a minimal increase in business services. This coupled with the stagnant labour market 
is a real cause for concern. Not only has the overall productivity been falling, the labour 
unions have also been unwilling to accept wage cuts. Finland is beginning to suffer from 
the inability to devalue its currency in order to make production cheaper. The labour force 
in general is ageing and the baby-boom generation has slowly moved into the retirement 
phase, adding to the state expenditure on pensions (Khan, 2015). These factors cumulatively 
have made Finland lose its AAA rating which has been downgraded to AA+ by both Fitch 
and S&P. This in turn has led to a fall in the interest rates for government bonds from 0.58 
to 10.44 and the short term interest rate now stands at -0.4% (Tiessalo, 2016). This is an 
alarming development which has led Finland to be the new “Sick Man of Europe” and the 
EU must deal with the burden of the lagging Finnish economy. 
Labour Market: 
One of the primary reasons behind the degradation of the Finnish government bonds 
from AAA to AA+ has been the loss in competitiveness in the local labour market. In what 
has been called the longest economic slump for the country since World War 2, ETLA 
claims that the average Finn worker is progressively working fewer hours on average than 
any other in the EU with a stark difference of 15% between Finland’s labour cost competi-
tiveness and that of Germany and Sweden (OECD, 2016). This factor has further aggravated 
the global export slowdown with a loss in the market share due to loss in competitiveness. 
Another concern is the fast ageing population, Finland is supposed to have the highest 
old-age dependency ratio among all EU countries by 2020, with 35.8 persons aged 65 or 
more per 100 people of working age (Rosendahl, 2015). This further raises concerns about 
the expected rise in government expenditure due to pensions and old-age schemes on the 
government pay roll expected to experience an upward trend and the debt already having 
exceeded the 60% of GDP level set by the EU. 
Finland's Economic Freeze
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Figure 3: Labour Productivity and Wages in Finland, Germany, Sweden and 
EU18
A. Labour productivity and wages B. Unit labour cost
Labour productivity Wage rate Finland Sweden Germany Euro Area (15)
2000 85.15443451 88.74919786 2000 91.59746591 89.40013771 103.2591531 87.6752711
2001 87.07805843 89.28049903 2001 94.36987644 93.90351216 102.9467573 89.73523872
2002 88.04146647 89.80630413 2002 95.73269589 95.17218889 103.5658151 92.39119672
2003 90.11827683 91.49859991 2003 96.14108654 96.08839576 104.4640172 94.57697931
2004 93.01620264 94.65607705 2004 96.37538243 95.63787462 103.9338432 95.52306388
2005 94.70231064 97.26792453 2005 98.64587786 96.16259799 102.8007807 97.22951582
2006 97.01547153 99.12405618 2006 99.62010354 96.05163291 100.6378178 98.25757959
2007 100 100 2007 100 100 100 100
2008 98.93579274 100.3616752 2008 105.8237646 105.6987568 102.8640026 104.0979988
2009 94.32961884 102.6527755 2009 114.0550797 111.4119381 109.3109882 108.7383089
2010 97.40791736 104.5604229 2010 112.5240976 108.6982586 108.2267295 108.0380194
2011 98.96838217 104.5360566 2011 114.9560707 111.9015115 108.7995886 108.4123029
2012 97.42178687 104.3579854 2012 120.7864936 116.307305 112.2594434 109.8204031
2013 98.02807233 104.1853092 2013 123.2292076 118.0025942 114.9156924 110.8422033
2014 98.13127142 104.6461682 2014 123.9977806 119.5774485 117.3669312 112.2639807
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 Source: OECD
The easiest way to solve the problem of competitiveness is to devalue the currency 
but unfortunately Finland lacks this capability given the Euro. It is important to note that 
Finland’s neighbour, Sweden, dealt with a labour cost crisis of its own following the 2008 
recession and was easily able to solve it by devaluing its crown currency. Although 64% 
percent of Finns still support the Euro, that number is decreasing given the inability of 
Finland to successfully tackle this crisis (Rosendahl, 2015). The government has proposed 
moderate wage deals and benefit cuts across all sectors with a special focus on healthcare, 
however the high degree of union presence in the country has hindered this process. The 
Government has proposed a social contract which attempts to increase the working hours 
by 5% at the same pay to try and boost productivity however the government in itself is seg-
regated (composed of a 3-party coalition) and the unions in comparison are much stronger 
and present across all sectors. Alternatively, a proposal to shorten annual leaves and public 
holidays, reducing medical leaves and cutting employer contributions to social security has 
been proposed (OECD, 2016), but no headway has been made so far. This deterioration of 
competitiveness has also resulted in a fall in non-price competitiveness as the world market 
demand has shifted away from Finnish based electronics and paper as a result of the boom in 
digital media and Nokia missing the “smartphone revolution”(Viita, 2014). The electronics 
market is being restructured while the paper and pulp market is now orienting itself towards 
areas it has the comparative advantage in globally however neither of the two is expected to 
act as a driver for growth in the short run and further contributes to the surge in unemploy-
ment. Labour unions are particularly stubborn given the high rate of taxation on personal 
income as well as corporate profits. The government has tried creating a more tax-friendly 
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environment to boost growth however at the same time is also trying to battle rising debt 
thus these efforts remain limited. 
Figure 4: Proportion of elderly people (over 65) as a percentage of total popu-
lation of country
 Source: OECD
Russia and Finland: 
Russia has historically been one of Finland’s greatest trading partners, the trade alliance 
between the two has originated from the Soviet-era economy when the Soviet economy 
was Finland’s greatest trade partner and boosted exports by more than 10%. In the first 
decade of the 21st century, this old relation was revived with the Nordic region more than 
doubling exports to Russia and Finland in specific increasing investment flows by a coef-
ficient of 8 (“Finnish exports,” 2015). When the electronic powerhouse, Nokia, began to 
decline and the euro region began slipping into recession, companies from all sectors such as 
Finland's Economic Freeze
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forestry and real estate seeked to find growing markets in the world’s largest energy export-
er. During that time, the Russian economy acted as a driver for growth which prevented 
Finland from undergoing an even deeper recession, providing stability and growth potential 
in the face of a volatile global market. Over this period of close relations, Finnish exports 
grew by 143% and direct investments rose to $4.3 Billion, amounting to 10% of Finland’s 
overall exports. Although not as high as 26.7%, the percentage of Finland’s exports that 
went to Russia in 1982 (“Finnish exports,” 2015), the exports were steadily rising as Russia 
further moved towards globalisation. The trade was mainly composed of Crude Petroleum 
and Petroleum derivatives from Russia. In turn, Finland provided Kaolin coated paper, 
ethylene polymer, precipitated copper and packaged medicaments (OECD, 2016). The 
scenario has changed greatly following Russia’s economic slowdown in the face of sanctions 
fuelled by political tensions. By Q2 2015, the Russian exports had already fallen by a stark 
37%, accounting for just 5.5% Finnish exports overall. The exports, now valued at $2.5 Bil-
lion (“Finnish exports,” 2015), have been one of the reasons for the inability of the Finnish 
economy to promote growth internally. The Finnish economy is highly dependent upon 
the world export market and the Russian slowdown further hinders the process of recovery 
that the Finnish are trying to undertake. The decline in trade has resulted in a slowdown in 
Finnish demand as well, with the trade deficit of Finland falling in 2015, despite a great de-
crease in Russian exports from Finland. The industries greatly impacted by this change have 
been the exports of foodstuffs, which fell by 78%, oil products, which fell by 42%, forestry 
products, which fell by 27%, metal products, which fell by 38%, and chemicals, which fell 
by 15% (“Finnish exports” 2015). The political situation in Crimea has resulted in Finland 
being in between a rock and a hard place. While it must cooperate with the EU and place 
sanctions on Russia which in turn hamper its own growth and trade, it must also bear the 
brunt of Russia placing reverse sanctions on the EU (as with the food industry). This situa-
tion has greatly exposed the export-dependency of the Finnish economy and reports suggest 
that the imposition of further sanctions by either parties could further damage the struggling 
Finnish economy. 
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Figure 5: Finnish exports to Russia, 1991-2015
 Source: Finnish Board of Customs 
Single Currency and EU unity: 
Much of Finland’s plans have been designed around the fact that it cannot devalue 
its own currency. The loss in labour cost competitiveness had occurred in 1991 and had 
been successfully overcome by devaluing the Markka. Similarly, the Finnish economy has 
suffered greatly from the sanctions placed on Russia by the EU due to the limited control 
it has over deciding the severity and targets of the sanctions. While Finland does publically 
support the need for sanctions on Russia, it has been a victim of both the EU sanctions and 
the counter-sanctions imposed by Russia. The Russian sanctions aren’t focussed on the 
Finnish economy, they are meant to target the EU at large but have a lopsided impact on the 
Finnish exports. This aspect has been recognised and public opinion has progressively been 
expressing its dissatisfaction with the Finnish involvement in the single currency. The ap-
proval ratings for the Euro have fallen form 67% to 64% in the past year and are expected to 
continue showing this downward trend. A 50,000 strong petition has forced Finland’s par-
liament to take up this issue and discuss it this year (Rosendahl, 2012). The changing public 
opinion has also been expressed through the rise of the True Finns party – a nationalist, anti-
immigrant, anti-euro party that won 19% of the vote in 2011 and is part of the three party 
coalition that forms the current government with a 17.7% majority. At a principle level, 
any export-dependent economy should have greater control over its currency given that 
it can only remain competitive in the international market if it can change the labour costs 
relative to other countries. The estimated cost of exiting the euro zone has been evaluated 
at 20 billion euros however it has been hypothesized that such a move would prove to be 
helpful in the long run. Given that the indicators show that the Eurozone is heading towards 
a recessionary phase in its business cycle, this may prove to be one of the most pivotal discus-
sions that the Finnish parliament undertakes. The asymmetric nature of the impact of EU 
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sanctions provides a great stimulus for the Finnish to value their own interests before those 
of the EU and they must reconsider their position on the monetary policy coordination in 
addition to the single currency integration. This is especially pertinent given that Finland’s 
neighbour, Sweden, has been able to achieve much greater economic success by retaining its 
currency in similar circumstances and being able to adjust the value of according to its needs.
Downfall of Nokia: 
The impact Nokia’s slowdown has had on Finland’s economy is often understated. 
Accounting for upto 4% of Finland’s GDP at its peak, Nokia was the driving force behind 
Finland’s export dependent economy. Microsoft’s decision to cut down the Finland Nokia 
branch to 900 from its original 24000 effectively marked the end of Nokia’s reign in the 
country. Once valued at $320 billion, Nokia acted as the engine for growth until the rise 
of Apple inc. which resulted in the tech giant catastrophically losing its market share and 
subsequently shutting down operations. Acting as not only the single greatest contributor 
to the rising unemployment in the country, Nokia has also been the reason for the collapse 
of the technology industry in the country. While making way for new startups to develop 
now, the tech giant’s presence has effectively crushed all startups in the country uptil now. 
Now, in the absence of Nokia, Finland faces a struggle to fill the void, with innovation 
getting stimulus but still lagging. The sheer quantitative impact Nokia’s demise has had is 
evident form the fact that Nokia made up 23% of Finland’s exports in 2007 and accounted 
for more than 30% of the corporate tax revenue the government received. This factor is 
often underemphasised and it is important to understand it as the root cause for unemploy-
ment, fall in government revenue, rising debt, export-dependency and a myriad of other 
economic factors (Viita, 2014). 
Quantitative relationship further explored in appendix attached below. 
Possible moves to consolidate economy: 
Finland must come to terms with the fact that its economy is weak and public debt will 
continue to rise, even as of now, it has the higher government spending as a share of GDP in 
the OECD. There is a dire need to consolidate public finances in order to curb the growing 
public expenditure as the baby-boom generation enters into the retirement phase. The main 
domestic financial vulnerability relates to high household debt. Although it is lower than 
other Nordic states, Finnish borrowers are mainly doing so via adjustable rate mortgages. 
While there are no signs of a housing bubble given that housing prices have been more or 
less constant, the OECD (2016) has already suggested that Finland should consider taking up 
minimum risk weights in mortgages, as is the case in Norway and Sweden, to help aid the 
synchronisation of risk-weight calculations across banks. One of the problems the economy 
is facing is that consolidation of public expenditure will impede growth to an unpredict-
able degree. The size of the fiscal multiplier is hard to predict, it seems to be small given 
that Finland has a small, open and well-functioning financial system however at the same 
time it has ample spare capacity, suggesting that the multiplier could be substantial. Another 
difficulty is that Nordic banks usually maintain low liquidity buffers. Thus a liquidity crisis 
triggered by events outside Finland could deepen the recession, the increasing political ten-
sion and sanctions between the EU and Russia is an example of such an event. Finland has 
already planned additional capital requirements which will be placed on four systematically 
important financial institutions from Q1 2016. The government has also been concerned 
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about the fact that deposits only make up 30% of the assets, a much smaller proportion 
compared to the rest of the OECD, and furthermore the share of liquid assets in the total 
assets is even lower. More reform to bring about higher liquidity barriers could benefit the 
Finnish economy in case of external shocks (OECD, 2016)
One of the leading lights of the recent Finnish development has been the focus on 
green development and environmental sustainability. While it has already pledged to reduce 
emissions by 16% in accordance with the EU Effort Sharing Decision and further pledged an 
80% reduction by 2050 (OECD, 2016), the stringent policies may shift the economy down 
a path where it doesn’t hold the comparative advantage even if it doesn’t directly impact 
competitiveness and productivity. Hence the government must first focus on eliminating 
subsidies which promote environmentally harmful products before giving out more subsi-
dies, this will also help with the rising public debt. 
The loss in labour cost competiveness has proven to be one of the greatest obstacles 
to growth and is expected to only improve gradually in the long run. The government has 
already begun implementing a 3 step plan to moderate wages, increasing working hours at 
the current ages to boost productivity and focus on cutting the number of holidays. The 
problem with this aspect still remains as the labour unions have a much stronger presence 
than the coalition government across all sectors and are unwilling to compromise any of the 
benefits they currently receive (OECD, 2016). This will remain a huge hindrance to growth 
and it is difficult to see a way forward for the Finnish economy. The easiest way would be to 
devalue the currency and that is where the Euro debate becomes so pertinent. The budget 
cuts proposed under the fiscal and pension consolidation plans need to be wary of network 
effects since cutting of pensions, research and education can have widespread implications 
that go beyond the first round effect. The unemployment increase due to these cuts must be 
offset by efficiency gains in order to raise employment over time. Despite these measures, 
the debt is still expected to rise till the 2020’s and estimated to cross the 70% mark as a pro-
portion of GDP (OECD, 2016).
Another area that is expected to be reformed is the taxation structure which currently 
stands as one of the most stringent is the OECD. The tax structure is argued to be at a point 
where the disadvantages accruing to the businesses may be greater than the advantages ac-
cruing to them in the form of public amenities and infrastructure. Finland has slowly been 
moving into a more tax-friendly environment to decrease the tax on corporate profits and 
income of labour as well as entrepreneurship as a way to increase household disposable in-
come which is among the lowest in the OECD. The government seeks to increase employ-
ment to 72% and reduce unemployment to 5% by 2019, this proposal seems too ambitious 
with unemployment currently at over 9% and expected to rise due to the demographical 
shifts. The government must thus focus on a policy reform which allows quicker entry of 
the youth, postponement of retirement (63 to 65 proposed by OECD would cut pension 
expenditure by 6% with exceptions for different categories) and improving work incentives 
and unemployment benefits to help increase the employment rate. This must further be bol-
stered by support for work immigrations and providing incentives to attract young workers 
into the country to boost both the productivity and employment rates (OECD, 2016). 
Finally, the government must continue its R&D efforts and reemphasise the importance of 
education as results being to taper off. 
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Appendix 
The Nokia Effect
Finland’s economic decline has been rather paradoxical; ranked second for global in-
novation by the World Economic Forum and with over $1.8 billion being invested by the 
government in the country’s tech market, Finland’s lack of success presents a unique case. 
The European Union’s only Nordic member has suffered a stark decline of 0.6 pc in the 
3rd quarter GDP growth rate of 2015, a figure worse than that of Greece. Current predic-
tions don’t paint a rosy picture with the Finnish economy destined to be one of the worst 
performing economies, only second to Greeks. Largely an export-import economy, Finland 
never truly managed to recover from the recession of 2008 despite being one of the stron-
gest proponents of financial austerity. What really has changed since the 2007-2008 period 
that has frozen Finland’s economy? This paper seeks to understand the quantitative impact 
of Nokia’s downfall on the Finnish economy. Once one of the leading innovators in the 
telephone and technology market, Nokia simply failed to catch on to the smartphone revo-
lution that swept the globe and Finland faced the consequences of the catastrophic decline 
of the tech giant. Nokia contributed a quarter of Finland’s growth from 1998 to 2007, gen-
erated a fifth of Finland’s exports, comprised 30% of expenditure on R&D, accounted for 
over 30% of Finland’s corporate tax revenue and up to 20% of Finland’s GDP. It is easy to 
heed the gravity of the impact that Nokia’s slowdown had on Finland. But, was this decline 
merely due to a decline in exports i.e. Nokia’s sales or was it due to a symbiotic chain reac-
tion that impacted not only the manufacturing industry but also had far reaching impacts on 
other realms. This paper seeks to understand the true relation between Finland’s GDP and 
Nokia’s revenue while also looking at the impact on employment, short term interest rates 
and controlling for other changes in the economy such as a decline in the manufacturing 
industry, exports to Russia and participation rate due to an ever-increasing old age depen-
dency ratio that plagues Finland. 
Data:
Collecting the data for such a test has been tricky. In order to get the appropriate num-
ber of observations (n>=30) to get a distribution close to the normal (t-distribution beyond 
n>=30 is more or less the same as a normal distribution), I had to collect quarterly data 
ranging from Q1 2001 to Q4 2015. The quarterly GDP data has been collected form the 
OECD website and comprises of 60 observations. The data has been collected for Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, EU (28 country 
average), OECD (35 country average) and Russia. Countries other than Finland have been 
included to try and study the relative effects that the recession had and the recovery of other 
EU economies while US, Japan and Russia have been taken as Finland’s prominent trading 
partners and thus controlling for level of trade. Unfortunately, similar data on China was un-
available thus these 3 act as a generalisation for the level of trade. The GDP is in USD, using 
current prices and Price Power Parity (PPP), seasonally adjusted and indexed for annual lev-
els (separate flag, actual numbers available). Collecting Nokia’s revenue was a rather tedious 
task, I had to go through the quarterly reports from Q1 2003- Q4 2015 individually to col-
lect the revenue stats, convert it into USD from Euro using PPP for each quarter and then 
extrapolate the observations to include Q1 2001- Q4 2002 using best available estimates. 
The unemployment data was gathered from Federal Reserse Economic Data (FRED), it 
expresses the quarterly harmonised unemployment rate for all persons in EU. Harmonised 
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unemployment rate is the measure used by the EU to express #unemployed/#labour force. 
The data has been seasonally adjusted and was extrapolated using best estimates from OECD 
to include Q1 2013- Q4 2015. I have also collected the breakdown of number of individu-
als employed in the economy by sector (manufacturing and tech for Nokia) from OECD. 
This data is quarterly and seasonally adjusted. The short term interest rates were only avail-
able annually thus have been acquired via the OECD. Since the ECB decides these inter-
est rates, they are already controlled for intra-country fluctuations in the EU region. The 
output of the paper industry, exports to Russia and participation rate as a percentage of adult 
population have been obtained from the OECD but were only available on an annual basis. 
These have been expressed in USD and current PPP. 
Summary Statistics:
We must begin by understanding the nature of the Finnish economy with respect to 
the Euro Zone it belongs to. Following the crisis of 2008, the Euro Zone has experienced 
a major downward swing characterised by an ageing population, fall in productivity and 
structural incompetency. Few economies have managed to succeed in this environment 
with Germany benefiting from the constantly undervalued currency, labour reforms and 
an emphasis on small scale industries which form the backbone of the economy. Greece 
has occupied the limelight of late, but its downfall is the result of a lack of land registry, a 
disproportional social security structure and the recursive nature of the debt trap in the EU. 
Finland, in turn, presents a rather paradoxical case. The administration based out of Helsinki 
has been one of the strongest proponents of financial austerity however has suffered from 
exogenous and endogenous shocks that have paralysed the economy.
Figure 6: GDP of Finland and EU, 2001-2015
 Source: OECD
As we can see, Finland’s GDP suffers a sharp decrease following Q3 2008, with the 
decrease being far more prominent than the one seen in the EU GDP. We hypothesize that 
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this fall in GDP was the result of the “Nokia Effect” with the null hypothesis being that it 
was directly the result of a recessionary trend in the global economy that impacted the entire 
euro zone. To analyse this claim we first understand the nature of the Finnish economy as 
being an export dependent one. 
Figure 7: Finnish and OECD exports 2001-2015
 Source: OECD
We can see that although the entire OECD experienced a decline in the exports fol-
lowing the 2008 period, the decline in Finland’s exports has been much more pronounced 
and the recovery has been comparatively smaller with the OECD average overtaking the 
Finnish exports in 2013. We propose that this was the result of Nokia missing the “smart-
phone revolution” and the rise of Apple inc. which led to a steady decline in Nokia’s 
revenue and overall global market share. Another aspect here is of the decline of the paper 
industry in the country and thus the output of the paper manufacturing industry will be 
used to control that impact. While a decrease in revenue may have had a direct impact on 
the GDP, it also tends to lead to second and third round effects. We see unemployment as 
one of the second round effects that result from the decline of an industry and sectoral shifts 
that result from a move away from technology and manufacturing. The general trend of 
the harmonised unemployment rate agrees with this hypothesis however we argue that the 
true extent of unemployment has been understated and there is an underlying force of a loss 
in worker productivity. Finland, over the years, has lost labour cost competitiveness in the 
market due a strong union presence, declining worker productivity and a rise in the cost of 
living. Since Finland cannot devalue its currency (Euro), this has been another factor that 
has led to a loss in revenue for the Finnish households and thus must be controlled for to 
understand the true impact of Nokia. To better understand the impact of the sectoral shift 
we look at the individuals employed by each sector to better understand this impact. 
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Figure 8: Labour Productivity and Wages in Finland, Germany, Sweden and 
EU15, 2000-2014
 Source: OECD
It is also important to understand that since the EU zone as a whole was experienc-
ing a recessionary trend, the monetary union took policies to try and increase expenditure 
and produce a countercyclical reaction. This tends to boost the GDP and can be observed 
through the interest rates. We must control for this factor as it doesn’t allow us to under-
stand the true impact of Nokia’s decline by cutting into the deficit via an increase in state 
expenditure and thus the GDP. To take exogenous impacts into account, we must consider 
the case of Russia, Finland’s 3rd largest trading partner. The two share a historical trade 
relationship which can be traced back to the soviet era. Given the recent Ukrainian crisis, 
Russia has come under heavy scrutiny in the form of economic sanctions. Despite being one 
of Russia’s prominent trading partners, Finland has been forced to impose sanctions along 
with the EU collectively which have further impacted trade relations and have a skewed ef-
fect against the Finnish due to the subjects of the sanctions and counter-sanctions by Russia. 
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Figure 9: Finnish exports to Russia, 1991-2015
 Source: Finnish Board of Customs 
This we must also control for the impact trade with Russia’s having on Finland’s GDP 
and categorise it as an exogenous shock. It is interesting to see this trend and the sudden fall 
following the 2008 crisis given that the EU as a whole increased trade with Russia during 
that period to safeguard themselves against further shocks from the west. 
Having established the basic framework, we first look at the basic relationship between 
Finland’s GDP and Nokia’s revenue without controlling for the factors mentioned. This is 
done simply to see the general trend from a quantitative aspect.
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Figure 10: Nokia’s Revenue and Finland’s GDP
 Source: Eurostat and Nokia Corp. Ltd. 
This part of the analysis becomes rather interesting. Initially, we can see that Nokia’s 
Revenue and Finland’s GDP definitely have a positive relationship that continues up till 
2008. Beyond this, we see a sharp decline in Nokia’s revenue while Finland’s GDP initially 
decreases but continues to grow at a lower rate. This is understandable given that Nokia’s 
decline initially produces a significant effect which causes GDP to drop but beyond that, the 
Finnish economy begins to adapt and replace the loss.
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Figure 11: Nokia’s Revenue and Finland’s GDP
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We see the final coefficient as a small negative number (-0.331). This is understandable 
since the data is skewed towards after 2008 (more data points for after 2008 than before) 
and also acts as an indicator that Nokia’s percentage change has been more acute than that 
of Finland’s percentage change which is understandable. 
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Table 12: Regression Coefficients under Various Controls
 Source: OECD, Eurostat and Nokia Corp. Ltd.
We begin by controlling for the general trend of the European Union economy. This 
test helps us move towards our research hypothesis of Nokia’s decline having a significant 
impact on the Finnish economy rather than just the recessionary cycle faced by the global 
economy. We see a high correlation of 0.72 with R-squared at 0.988, this already begins 
to show that the independent economic performance of Finland is highly dependent of 
Nokia’s Revenue. Next, we control for the Russian economy. Russia has long been one 
of the major partners for Finland with trade as high as 26.8% of Finland’s exports going to 
Russia. The recent sanctions of Russia in the aftermath of the Crimean incident have had a 
skewed effect on the Finnish economy. Even after controlling for the Russian economy, we 
still see a strong correlation of 0.601, the coefficient has decreased as a part of Nokia’s sales 
also occur in Russia thus explaining the drop in the correlation between Finland’s GDP and 
Nokia’ revenue. At last, we test the relation between Finland and Nokia while controlling 
for unemployment. This is a direct test for our research hypothesis which argues that inter-
nal factors such as unemployment were the true reason for Finland’s decline beyond just a 
decline in exports via fall in Nokia’s revenue sales. The results are as expected; while con-
trolling for unemployment, the correlation coefficient between Finland’s GDP and Nokia’s 
Revenue falls to 0.106. This shows that the decline in GDP was a result of factors that were 
channelled through unemployment rather than directly through a decline in the revenue 
of Nokia. We can conclude that although Nokia had a significant impact on the Finnish 
economy in terms of exports, its impact on unemployment was, in turn, the dominant fac-
tor in the decline of Finland’s GDP. The changes in unemployment were largely a result of 
structural changes which stemmed from a sectoral shift in the economy caused Nokia due 
to factories being shut down overnight as well as large scaling back process with an intra-
company shift away from hardware as well as a large fall in the labour force participation rate 
which seems to have skewed this effect. This impact is further aggravated due to the high 
old-age dependency ratios and thus fails to present a complete picture of the real unemploy-
ment scenario in Finland. 
To conclude, the “Nokia Effect” has often been regarded as one of the most dominant 
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ones in the recent economic history of Finland, however we see that the true impact came 
through the unemployment that Nokia’s decline caused rather than a decline in the revenue 
of Nokia, which formed a large proportion of Finland’s exports, itself. 
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